What happened to "fundamental fairness"
I've been working on a brief involving the disclosure of an informant's identity. The Supreme Court set forth the law on the issue back in 1957 - in a a case called Rovario v. United States. This post is not a discussion of the law - instead, it's a comment on how much things have changed over the years as far as the attitude of the courts goes.
I have probably read Rovario at least 10-20 times over the years - if not more. No matter how many times you read something you can always learn something new, and that was certainly the case for me. Here are two passages that jumped out at me:
The fact that petitioner here was faced with the burden of explaining or justifying his alleged possession of the heroin emphasizes the vital need for access to material witnesses. Otherwise, the burden of going forward might become too heavy.
Petitioner's opportunity to cross-examine Police officer Bryson and Federal narcotics agent was hardly a substitute for an opportunity to examine the man who had been nearest to him and took part in the transaction....The was the only witness who could have testified to petitioner's possible lack of knowledge of the contents of the package that he transported from the tree to John Doe's car. The desirability of calling John Doe as a witness, or at least interviewing him in preparation for trial, was a matter for the accused rather than the government to decide.
What struck me about this discussion is the underlying assumption that the defendant really was presumed innocent, and perhaps the informant could prove that. Generally, trial judges will say something along the lines of "your client was there, so he knows who it is". In other words, we know he's guilty - how could such a witness help you. Things look completely different when you entertain the possibility that the accused isn't guilty - all of the sudden witnesses may actually be helpfully.
Earlier in the opinion the Court talked of "fundamental requirements of fairness". When you look at most of the older decisions, you often see that phrase. Unfortunately, it is noticeably absent from more recent decisions. If they mention it, it's only in passing. And it seldom means what it did back then.
Criminal trials should be about "fairness"; that means the accused should have a meaningful opportunity to defend themselves. It also means the courts shouldn't assume everyone is guilty. Maybe they aren't; if the recent history of exonerrations teaches anything it should be that not everyone charged with a crime is guilty. There are people falsely accused. Perhaps if we did a better job of recognizing that, we could cut down on wrongful convictions. Here's for getting back to trials the true meaning of "fairness".